Introduction
In 2008 president Bush signed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, or HERA, which created a new regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, with expanded conservatorship and receivership authorities. Only months after the law's passage, both GSEs were placed into conservatorship. The government chose conservatorship because it wanted to protect the investors in their bonds, the ranks of which included many foreign governments as well as U.S. banks with an already tenuous grip on solvency. Conservatorship also allowed the Treasury to avoid the question of whether the trillions of dollars of GSE debt could be kept off of the government's balance sheet.
When the Treasury took the two entities over it assigned itself ownership of just under 80% of the two, along with annual dividends worth ten percent of its investment. In the intervening years it has injected a total of $187.5 billion into the two.
In 2012 the Treasury amended its arrangement by assigning itself the right to "sweep" the entire net wealth of Fannie and Freddie into its coffers. The arrangement effectively meant that the other shareholders were shut out of any residual profits earned by the two. The effective zeroing out of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's shareholders stands in stark contrast to the other financial companies the government bailed out--outside of the avenue of bankruptcy--during the 2008 financial crisis. Citibank and AIG's shareholders retained ownership of a portion of the company, and even Countrywide, National City, and Bear Sterns' shareholders---all insolvent when taken over at the government's behest by a rival company-received something for their stock in the mergers engineered by Treasury. Obviously none of these companies enjoyed a congressional charter, leaving any comparison informative but incomplete.
What is of particular importance today is that the Treasury will soon report that the federal government has recouped its core investment.
While the economy has slowly returned to some semblance of normalcy, the housing market's recovery appears fragile and far from complete. Housing prices have appreciated from their postrecession depths but remain below pre-recession prices in most markets, with 13 percent of all mortgaged homes displaying negative equity in the third quarter of 2013.
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The government is now contemplating a major reform of the government's role in housing finance, with legislation proposed in both the Senate Banking Committee as well as the House Financial Services committee. There is also a major private sector plan proposed by one of the major GSE shareholders. Each offers certain improvements but the one getting bipartisan support-the Johnson-Crapo bill-would place the approximately $5 trillion of outstanding GSE debt on the government's balance sheet, an unprecedented move and one that the government went to great lengths to avoid in 2008.
Governmental responses to the housing bust, at the both the federal and local levels, have been characterized by a repeated disregard for the interest and claims of investors. as well as a resolution regime that mirrored that for commercial banks. It also allowed the Treasury to provide temporary support to the agency debt market.
In order to avoid the GSEs falling into receivership, which would have imposed losses on creditors and could have resulted in the government placing the GSE debt onto its books, 5 the new regulator placed them under conservatorship. Treasury's primary objective at the timebesides keeping a lid on its liabilities --was to protect GSE creditors, particularly since a number of foreign central banks were heavily invested in GSE debt.
Ultimately, Fannie and Freddie received a total of $187.5 billion in support from the U.S.
Treasury-i.e. U.S. taxpayers. The Treasury entered into a Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreement with each GSE that 6 required the GSEs to pay a 10 percent dividend payment to the Treasury on any shares that they purchase.
In August of 2012, a third amendment to the purchase agreements ended the payment of dividends and instead instituted a sweep of profits. Unlike the initial purchase agreements, which were executed between the Treasury and the Boards of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the third amendment was agreed to by Treasury and FHFA, acting on behalf of the GSEs in its role as conservator. The third amendment eliminates the GSEs' ability to retain earnings, build capital or distribute dividends.
The Budgetary Treatment of GSEs
Despite the extraordinary financial investment and control exercised over Fannie Mae and In contrast, OMB projects cash transactions between the Treasury and the GSEs and expects to collect dividends in excess of the total amount ultimately invested. This methodology is only indirectly related to the overall magnitude of the GSEs' book of business, to the extent that GSE operations remain profitable and can afford the dividends claimed by the Treasury.
The Budgetary Implications of GSE Reform
Any change to the current status of Fannie Mae and Freddie would impact the federal budget, although how the federal budget authorities score those changes varies substantially.
There are two different budgetary impacts worth considering: The first is the "official" score from CBO or OMB, based on the assumptions of steady economic growth and a stable housing market. The second would be the budget impact in the event that the assumptions of a quiescent economy and housing market no longer held.
There are three major reform proposals currently getting attention: one is a bipartisan bill 
Corker-Warner, S. 1217
S. 1217 would wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and end their operations over five years.
Outstanding debt obligations and mortgages would be transferred from the GSEs to a holding company, and the federal government would guarantee repayment of those obligations. CorkerWarner would create the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation (FMIC) to replace the GSEs in the mortgage market. Unlike the replaced entity envisioned in the PATH Act, the FMIC would provide an explicit federal guarantee on the mortgage-backed securities it insured.
9 http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/hr2767.pdf
CBO has yet to score Corker-Warner: How it would do so depends on the degree to which it perceived that the bill would change the existing subsidy costs assumed in the baseline. It would likely result in a reduction in subsidy costs to the extent that the bill would reduce the federal role in providing mortgage loan guarantees and securitization, and thus would score as deficit reduction. However, that the new entity would also be providing explicit federal guarantees on new mortgages as well, lessening the reduction in the estimated subsidy costs resulting from the wind-down of the GSEs.
The assumption of the current debt of the GSEs leaves the government on the hook once again should another housing price decline occur in the near future. While it may be a low-probability event it is also a high cost event to the government, and made higher by the new guarantee.
OMB has not estimated the effects of Corker-Warner either, but as with the PATH Act, the budgetary effects observed by OMB would reflect extra-governmental transactions -the magnitude of which would reflect the net payments from the holding company and forgone dividends. To the extent any new proceeds exceed the projected dividend payments assumed in the baseline, the bill would be deemed as raising revenue. Just as with CBO, that score assumes a relatively quiescent economy and housing market, since another recession or real estate downturn would leave the government on the hook for any defaults on government-backed mortgages.
Johnson-Crapo
The Senate efforts, in the current political environment, are likely to continue to include an explicit government guarantee of mortgage credit risk.
IPO Scenario
An additional policy option widely discussed in the media would involve federal government selling its nearly 80 percent ownership stake in the GSEs. 12 While CBO would likely view this proposal as a reduction in subsidy costs relative to its baseline similar to the PATH Act, it is not clear how CBO would contemplate the disposition of warrants on common stock relative to the current baseline. To the extent that the CBO baseline does not contemplate an equity sale of Treasury's stake in the GSEs, that sale would score as deficit reduction. This would be highly dependent on valuation, but one estimate suggests a net deficit reduction of $118 billion. Part of the policy debate has been and will continue to be about efforts to transform financial markets so as to lessen the likelihood of future bailouts, as well as the market's perception that a bailout can occur. Debates about breaking up banks are motivated by a desire to make those institutions small enough so that one or more could fail while posing no more than a minimal risk to the rest of the financial system. Similar issues arise with Fannie and Freddie: The existence of a multitude of GSEs, such as those found in the Federal Home Loan Bank System, could make the rescue of any one less necessary. Restraining the ability of the executive branch and that of independent regulators to rescue failing firms without the explicit act of Congress could be another avenue, but it too amounts to a promise that future congresses would have no compelling reason to keep.
The receivership provisions for Fannie and Freddie, which Congress passed in 2008, were also viewed as an avenue for ending the implied guarantees, as it created a mechanism for imposing losses on creditors rather than the taxpayer. Of course such a mechanism must be credible, and at the time of the rescue of Fannie and Freddie their regulator possessed sufficient authority to protect the taxpayer from any loss. Their regulator, the FHFA, ultimately chose not to use that authority. Accordingly, the extent of any implied guarantee depends upon the expected behavior of regulators and the range of allowable activities facing regulators. Having the tools in place to avoid bailouts is no guarantee that they will, in fact, be avoided. Although it is likely impossible to completely end implied guarantees, a number of policy changes can be made to reduce the likelihood of it occurring again.
Conclusion
This is typically the part of the paper where the authors declare the equivalent of Q.E.D. and offer the way out of the current morass. While we feel that we have successfully prosecuted the brief that the status quo for the GSEs is untenable and that the current reform proposals have severe flaws, we do not have a single way to fix the problem to offer. Instead, we offer a few rules to guide any future reform dialogue, should an honest one ever develop.
Protect the Taxpayer the government has a duty to ensure that the taxpayers' money is prudently protected. The Treasury has recouped its core investments in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the reform plans currently being discussed would generate more revenue from the GSEs.
However, some reform plans-most notably Johnson-Crapo-would place the debt held by that often lack a basis in either fact or law. Similarly, the priority of claims was violated in the auto bailouts, favoring some creditors over others in a manner that appeared to be driven largely by politics. Such actions sowed uncertainty and likely reduced investment, slowing the pace of the recovery. In order to promote economic growth and financial stability, mortgage finance reform should establish a system based upon rules and not the arbitrary discretion of politicians.
The treatment of private equity holders in the GSEs has also been marred by uncertainty. It is true that those shareholders who kept their stock in the GSEs--or those who purchased it after the two went into conservatorship--were promised nothing, as befits a residual claimant, other than a share of what was left over after the other creditors were satisfied. But to peremptorily take away the privileges being a residual claimant shortly after it became clear that the position might be worth something is not good policy. While private equity holders have no property interest in the Congressional charters, a wind-down or resolution of the GSEs should provide for any excess value, where assets exceed liabilities, to flow to all equity holders.
The American system of mortgage finance has long been characterized by extensive government distortions and political meddling. The roots of the recent crisis can be found, along with monetary policy, in our current system of mortgage finance. To maintain the current system would be reckless, but it is crucial that any replacement actually be an improvement and not simply rearrange the deck-chairs on a proverbial Titanic. 
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